Making Nothing Out of Something: Concepts of Nothingness, Sartre and the Theatre of Peter Brook by Power, Cormac
Power, Cormac (2010) ‘Making Nothing Out of Something: Concepts of Nothingness, 
Sartre, and the Theatre of Peter Brook’, Consciousness, Literature and the Arts, 11 (3). 
  
In Peter Handke’s 1966 play Offending the Audience the ‘Four Speakers’ step forward onto 
an empty stage. Much of the play consists of these four speakers issuing a series of denials 
and negations of the theatrical situation, even to the point of denying the fact of theatrical 
representation itself. The play seems to ask questions about the theatre’s potential to deny 
what it is, or appears to be, as a material medium. At one point the Speakers address the 
audience with the following: 
The emptiness of the stage is no picture of another emptiness. The emptiness of this 
stage signifies nothing. This stage is empty because objects would be in our way. It 
is empty because we don’t need objects. This stage represents nothing. It represents 
no other emptiness. This stage is empty. (Handke, 1971, 16) 
The dialogue seems to offer two simultaneous yet contradictory possibilities. The Speakers 
enact a dematerialising of the stage by relentlessly telling the audience that there is nothing 
in particular to see, while in the very act of doing so they seem explicitly to draw attention to 
their presence onstage and to the immediate material context of theatrical representation. 
While the ironic tone of this play seems to suggest a deliberate self-repudiation of its 
premise, I wish to pursue this question that Peter Handke sets up: to what extent can theatre 
“make nothing” of itself, and what, if anything “comes” of making nothing? 
Handke’s play is not the only example of a radical theatrical reduction. Perhaps the clearest 
expression of this tendency is found in Jerzy Grotowski’s statement in which he proposes a 
theatre that would divest itself of all unnecessary accoutrements: 
By gradually eliminating whatever proved superfluous, we found that theatre can 
exist without make-up, without autonomic costume and scenography, without a 
separate performance area (stage), without lighting and sound effects etc. It cannot 
exist without the actor-spectator relationship of perceptual, direct, “live” communion. 
(Grotowski, 1991, 19)   
The impoverished theatre that Grotowski speaks of is also reflected in the work of many 
prominent playwrights.  Jon Erickson refers to the “immense hollowness and emptiness” 
that, despite the “obsessive chatter,” (Erickson, 1999, 13) lies at heart of the theatre of 
Chekhov, Pinter and Beckett. This emptiness is perhaps found in its most extreme form in 
Beckett’s play Breath where the reduction includes even the figure of the performer. It is 
important to note, however, that this nihilating impulse does not (necessarily) point to a form 
of philosophical nihilism. In Beckett’s novel Molloy, the protagonist points to nothingness as 
a figure of almost mystical aspiration: 
For to know nothing is nothing, not to want to know anything likewise, but to be 
beyond knowing anything, to know you are beyond knowing anything, that is when 
peace enters in, to the soul of the incurious seeker (Beckett, 1994, 64). 
While the Zen like state that Beckett’s narrator evokes implies a rejection of signification and 
a kind of personal via negativa of the mind, the principle of negation in Beckett functions 
more clearly with respect to the narratorial voice. The novel ends as the character Jacques 
Moran contemplates writing a report on his unsuccessful search for Molloy: “Then I went 
back into the house and wrote, It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not 
midnight. It was not raining” (1994, 176). In this instance, a concept of nothingness is not 
directly invoked but arises out of the force of contradiction: one proposition negates the 
other.  
Thinking about nothingness in relation to theatrical representation, however, presents very 
particular problems. The fact that a theatrical performance frequently involves an audience 
gathering around a stage to watch one or more performers immediately suggests that there 
must always be something. Moreover, not only is the stage and its components “something” 
in a material sense, those materials also signify something, or at least are liable to be 
interpreted as meaning something by an audience. Despite the declarations of Handke’s 
Speakers, surely theatre is ever the staging of something rather than nothing. 
The concept of nothing is also controversial within philosophical and scientific contexts. 
Materialist philosophies from Stoicism in the Ancient World to a modern day materialist such 
as Gilles Delueze reject the concept of nothingness within their ontological schemas. 
Modern day quantum physics also calls into question the possibility of nothingness and 
denies the existence of an absolute void.[1] While concepts of nothingness perhaps find a 
more natural home within aesthetics, due to art’s frequent concern for the non-real and 
imaginary, the concept of nothingness has also been critiqued within this domain. 
Contemporary artist Pierre Bismuth puts the matter very directly: 
It’s very simple. Art that claims to be about nothing, absence, silence, emptiness, 
vacuity, nothingness … never is … Nothingness constitutes a strategy that enables 
the artists to free his or her activity from any form of social pressure … In art, 
‘nothing’ exists only for those who are ready to believe in it” (Bismuth in Gussin and 
Carpenter 2001, 181-182). 
 Here Bismuth alludes to potentially solipsistic tendencies in (strands of modernist?) art 
whereby the work exists only in relation to itself, regardless of external context of spectatorial 
interpretation. The claim to represent nothing becomes self-serving and effectively bars a 
meaningful dialogue with the audience or social world. The problem with “nothing,” for 
Bismuth, is that it exists (if that is the right word), in direct opposition to the “something” that 
constitutes the milieu of artistic production, spectatorship and political interaction. 
While Bismuth’s complaints may well amount to a valid critique of particular artists’ claims 
about the meaning of their work, not all conceptions of nothingness operate in such radical 
opposition to the material world. In other words, the concept of nothing does not always 
preclude the existence of something. One of the most evocative accounts of nothing can be 
found in the writings of the ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu who points out that 
emptiness is fundamental to the material world. A cup or vessel is defined by the empty 
hollow that makes its use possible; the spokes of a wheel meet at the hollow at the centre; 
the walls of a house contain an empty space while doors presuppose a gap that makes 
entrance and exit possible. Here nothingness is construed, not as the absolute void, but as 
operative within the material, helping to shape and define a material reality.[2] The Hindu and 
Buddhist concept of Śūnyatā establishes a slightly different idea of nothingness. Again, 
nothingness is not conceived as the inverse of the material but in terms of the insubstantial 
nature of reality. All objects in the world, including the ‘self’, are held to have 
no independent existence. Buddhist philosophy emphasises that the existence of every thing 
is connected to the existence of every other thing, hence the fundamental ‘emptiness’ of the 
self and all other objects that deceptively appear to manifest an independent existence.   
If these notions of nothingness seem rather far removed from theatrical performance then 
perhaps we might consider, by way of example, a drama game probably familiar to most 
drama teachers called “What are you doing?” In this game the participants form a circle and 
one participant comes into the middle of the circle and enacts a mime of a familiar activity, 
such as brushing her hair. A second participant enters the circle and asks of the first 
participant “what are you doing?” The first participant must then respond by naming any 
activity except the one that she is actually miming, for example “I’m driving a car.” The game 
continues as the second person then mimes the action “driving a car” until another player 
enters the circle, asks the question, and receives an answer which changes the activity; thus 
the game continues until everyone in the circle has contributed an action. This simple warm-
up exercise demonstrates the way that nothingness can be seen as operative within 
theatrical enactment. A principle of negation underpins the movement of the game as each 
player must answer to the question what they are not doing, thus allowing a new action to be 
introduced. The actions in themselves are ‘empty’ in that they are devoid of context or any 
sense of believability. The various mimes that participants create are not ends in themselves 
but merely a means to actualising a series of physical transformations. It is the gap between 
the question “what are you doing?” and the physicalisation of the response that constitutes 
the centre of the game, the spokes that meet at the wheel’s hub.   
András Kovács traces the modern philosophical concept of nothingness to Hegel, 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and notes that it is Sartre who “translates the concept into a 
series of everyday situations where man is alone, disappointed by his beliefs and 
expectations, desperately looking for something solid in a situation where his own identity is 
called into question” (Kovács, 2006 136). Sartre’s theory of nothingness, however, is not a 
negative concept in the traditional sense. Nothingness here does not simply refer to the 
absence of everything.  Rather, nothingness is a fundamental result of the interaction of 
consciousness and world, and it is through nothingness that the subject defines him/herself. 
Nothingness for Sartre therefore, is far from being a purely negative concept. His 
existentialist project aimed to reveal the potential transcendence of human consciousness 
from the physical constraints of the world. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre proposed that to 
define the human being we must first understand that humans lack being. Unlike the objects 
we see and interact with, we can never attain the stable sense of self-identity of mere 
objects. Permanently faced with choices and an infinite field of thought and action, we 
forever create who and what we are. Sartre draws the radical conclusion that we are, in a 
sense, nothing: ‘human reality is before all else its own nothingness’ (Sartre, 2003, 112). 
Being nothing should not be a cause of despondency though, for it is this refusal to be 
defined that gives human consciousness its unique sense of freedom. Sartre affirms that 
‘Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the 
being of man and his being-free’ (Sartre, 2003, 49). Since ‘nothingness’, in Sartre’s 
evocative image, ‘lies coiled at the heart of being – like a worm’ (Ibid.), we remain locked in a 
process of self-realisation that can never be completed. If dissatisfaction with life is a 
specifically human characteristic, then our consolation is the ever-present possibility to 
redefine ourselves and our relationship to our realities. 
While Sartre manages to locate the concept of nothingness within the concrete relationships 
between consciousness and world, applying phenomenological perspectives to theatre 
would at first glance appear to be in conflict with any attempt to relate nothingness to stage 
representation. Both States (1985) and Garner (1994) emphasise material facticity in their 
respective studies on theatre and phenomenology. States suggests that “[w]hat the text 
loses in significative power in the theatre, it gains in corporeal presence” (States 1985, 29), 
while Garner asserts that theatre can be understood as a “play of actuality” (Garner 1994, 
43).[3] Alice Rayner, on the other hand, seems much less committed to a zero-degree 
materiality in her study Ghosts, Death’s Double and the Phenomena of Theatre (2006), and 
is more concerned to reveal “a principle of negativity or invisibility within visibility” (Rayner 
2006, xi). Discussing Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Rayner pays special 
attention to the rude mechanical’s performance of Pyrimus and Thisbe in which Snout, 
playing Wall, visually represents a chink through which the lovers can communicate:      
The hole, the permeable place in the boundary, is no-thing … Nothing in itself, the 
chink in Wall not only makes communication between the opposing sides possible; it 
also allows us to see that the two worlds are arbitrarily divided into opposition and 
that they form part of one world. No-thing, as the Buddhists would say, is not simply 
the opposite of something or nonbeing as distinct from being. Wall, like a curtain, 
creates the image of duality … but like all the duos of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
court and forest, play and audience, dream and waking, the two parts interpenetrate 
(Rayner 2006, 152). 
In Rayner’s example, nothingness is conceived of as a point of intercession between two 
(seemingly) incompatible worlds or elements. The gap between the world of the play and 
that of the audience is perhaps the most fundamental extension of Shakespeare’s Wall 
metaphor.  Though the audience may experience the feeling of being physically proximate to 
the performance, there remains, in Sartre’s terms “an impassable distance” between actor 
and audience: “The actor is so distant that I can see him but will never be able to touch him 
or act upon him” (cited in Ben Chaim, 1984, 17). In other words, a sense of nothingness can 
be seen as underpinning the tensions and dualities which constitute so much that is specific 
to theatrical experience.  These dualities are nowhere better described that in Bert O. 
States’ Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of Theatre, where he 
suggests that there is a fundamental tension in theatre between the object as “thing” and the 
object as “image.” States draws attention to specific objects that seem to resist becoming 
seamlessly absorbed into the world of a play. On stage, a working clock, a fountain, or fire 
retain “a certain primal strangeness;” the water fountain is “a happening taking place within 
the aesthetic world: with running water something indisputably real leaks out of the illusion” 
(1985: 31). States’ distinction between “thing” and “image” is strongly reminiscent of Sartre’s 
dualistic approach to perception and imaginary object, which he develops in his work The 
Psychology of Imagination (1972). Here Sartre argues that imagination, by positing 
nothingness, negates the world of perceptual reality.[4] As is suggested in States’ example of 
the water fountain, however, in theatre there is a tug of war between the object as-vehicle-
for-“illusion” and the “indisputable” reality of the object. Acts of imagination in theatre do not 
amount simply to the substitution of an existent reality for a hypothetical reality (or unreality), 
but often involve an oscillation between different perceptual registers. 
An emphasis on imagination as a central element in theatrical performance—or in 
determining what theatre should be like—has been a key feature of attempts to formulate a 
theatrical aesthetic that would counter the tendency to construct detailed illusion. From a 
perspective which foregrounds the collusive act of imagination, the reality of the stage and 
its properties is that which should be highlighted and played upon. As Peter Brook put it, the 
stage should be “freed from any decorative statement that confines the imagination” (Brook, 
1993, 116). One of the most recognisable “Brookian” techniques involves, as Colin Counsell 
points out, employing objects “synechdochally”, (whereby a part represents a greater whole) 
and “metaphorically” (Counsell, 1996, 149). Thus a single wheel represents a chariot in The 
Mahabharata (1985), an industrial cable spool represents a war machine in Ubu aux 
Bouffes (1978), or spinning plates are used to depict flowers in the forest of Arden inA 
Midsummer Night’s Dream (1970). Theatre which turns away from illusion and naturalistic 
scenography and stops being about a specific time and place, instead opting for the 
transformative potentials of the “empty space” becomes more about what is happening 
“now” between actors and audience. As Brook notes, “The essence of theatre is within a 
mystery called ‘the present moment’” (Brook, 1993, 81). 
  
Peter Brook’s famous invocation of the phrase in his book The Empty Space is premised on 
a gap between the visible and the invisible; “the stage,” Brook suggests, “is a place where 
the invisible can appear.”[5] Brook’s empty space is suggestive of a stage that would not set 
out to represent the world as it familiarly appears to us, but that the stage should be a place 
of creativity which engages the audience in imaginative acts, problematising the validity of 
the world-as-perceived. Hence Peter Brook’s repeated emphases on modes of theatrical 
representation in different historical and cultural contexts which reveal the world as 
transformational process. As Robert Corrigan, explaining Peter Brook theatrical philosophy 
puts it: 
The base root of the theatrical event is its transformational character, and when it has 
been most vital the empty space of the stage has been transformed into the ‘sacred 
space’ of the play. (Corrigan, 1984, 157) 
 Emptiness in Brook, as with nothingness in Sartre, is not a literal facet of what Brook would 
call the “visible” world. The Elizabethan stage that Brook takes as an exemplar was clearly 
no more “empty” than Lao Tzu’s hollow vessel is “nothing;” both instances seem to offer a 
possibility of transformation and creation rather than nullification. But how specifically can 
theatre create “nothing”?  
In their article “What do Brook’s Bricks Mean?: Toward a Theory of the Mobility of Objects in 
Theatrical Discourse” (1981), Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan provide an analysis of the use of 
objects in Peter Brook’s Ubu aux Bouffes, a 1978 production of two of Alfred 
Jarry’s Ubu plays. This article deals with the transformative nature of the theatrical object in 
this Brook production, particularly in relation to two dominant physical elements; a large 
wooden wheel and a collection of building bricks. Throughout the performance, the actors 
interact with these and other objects to construct fictional locations and fields of activity. 
Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan discuss an episode from the production whereby the actress 
playing Mère Ubu brings a “handful” of bricks onto the middle of the stage and arranges 
them around the wheel. As they explain, “The bricks function here both as plates and as 
various items of food she is preparing for her guests” (Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan, 1981, 28). 
Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan derive several possible “sentences” from what follows: 
  
-          an actress puts bricks on a wheel … 
-          Mrs Ubu lays the table, putting bricks on it … 
-          An actress makes setting and props out of bricks 
  
In the same scene, the actor playing Père Ubu snatches a brick from the table, making 
gestures of biting and chewing. Potential sentences: 
  
-          the actor pretends to eat bricks 
-          Ubu eats a chicken. (Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan, 1981, 28). 
Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan would see such moments as instances of a “simultaneous 
participation [of theatrical objects] in different semantic fields, leading to an incessant 
‘semantization’ and ‘resematization’ (semantic mobility)” (Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan, 1981, 
13). While it is not my intention here to investigate theatrical representation in relation to its 
supposed participation within semantic structures, I would like instead to consider how such 
moments of theatricality might relate to the Sartrean concept of nothingness. Two 
possibilities, such as that of the “actor pretending to eat bricks” and “Ubu eating a chicken” 
existing within one theatrical image, possibilities that are irreconcilable, are seen to be 
existing simultaneously. A “nothingness” is created from the mutual negation of the 
contradictory elements that comprise the image; our awareness of the actor’s presence is at 
odds with our acceptance of the character’s presence. At the same time the representation 
of “Ubu eating a chicken” in fictional time/place is belied by the fact that the audience see an 
actor in front them doing something that seems to be at odds with the representation. Of 
course, in one sense this point could be applied to theatrical representation in a much wider 
sense; actors playing characters are not the same as the characters they are playing and 
hence there is typically a disparity between the stage as a medium and those things that are 
represented on the stage. However, as David Saltz notes in “How to Do Things on Stage”, 
this disparity is not always made explicit to the audience: 
Actors commit real actions, and often those actions can be just the actions they seem 
to be committing. When the character raises an arm, the actor really raises an arm; 
and when the character, in raising that arm, is reaching for a glass, the actor really 
reaches for a glass. Occasionally, an actor may really commit an action only under 
some of its descriptions. But only in the case of actions inappropriate or impractical on 
stage, such as murdering, must the actor resort to committing an action that is 
radically different from the character’s (Saltz, 1991, 33). 
 Inevitably, actors onstage, even when playing characters in a fictional world, will 
actually do lots of things which are not (merely) pretended. Indeed, in terms of the 
actor’s activities onstage - even within fictional dramatic matrices - many of the actions that 
an actor may represent are actions which they also carry out. It is only, as Saltz points out, 
when it becomes impractical for the actor to commit the actions of the character, that the 
actor is compelled to commit an action “that is radically different from the character.” 
 In the case of Brook’s Ubu Aux Bouffes, however, the disparity between the actors’ actions 
(laying bricks on a wheel, pretending to eat them etc) and the actions of the characters 
(laying a table, eating a chicken) can hardly be explained in terms of the impracticality of 
having the actors actually commit the represented actions. I would suggest that the nature of 
theatricality here is connected to Brook’s concept of theatre as the “invisible-made-visible” 
which is underpinned by the concept of nothingness. Saltz’s description of theatrical 
representation in which actors really commit the same kind of actions as the characters 
would conform to an understanding of theatre which remains in what Brook terms “the 
visible.” A visual congruence between medium and representation tends to reinforce a sense 
that the world is made up of the tangible material realm which is readily available to 
perception. A total commitment to the visible/material is clearly at odds with Brook’s 
philosophy, upon which he expounds in the following terms:   
Essentially we are talking of making the invisible visible. Virtually all modern theatre 
recognises this vast, partly Freudian world, where behind the seen gesture of a 
spoken word lies an invisible zone, the site that drives the ego and the superego, the 
repressed; what is conscious and unconscious and behind that lies another zone, 
more distant and invisible that the former … it contains very powerful sources of 
energy. (Dundjerović, 2007, 36) 
 To make visible an “invisible zone” upon the stage requires a problematization of the 
perceptual, in which the audience experience a contradiction between that which is material 
and directly perceived (actors committing actions) and that which immaterial and not part of 
the visible world (the characters within a fictional world). To invoke Sartre’s distinction 
between perception and imagination, as audience weperceive the actor pretending to eat 
bricks and simultaneously imagine the character eating food. Although Sartre does not give 
the semi-mystical status the invisible/imaginary as Brook does, the imaginary is nonetheless 
vital if consciousness is to generate nothingness, with all the potential for radical freedom 
that the concept guarantees. The invisible/imaginary serves as an alternative to the 
visible/perceptual; it is ultimately formless and empty, capable of undermining the pre-given 
fixity of the materially visible.   
To apply Sartre’s perception-imagination distinction to the example of Brook’s Ubu Aux 
Bouffes, however, is also to problematise the distinction. Sartre suggests that imagination 
“negates” perception; consciousness asserts its freedom by pushing the perceived out of the 
way. In the case of Ubu, however, both the perceived and the imaginary seem to operate 
side by side; we see actors manipulating bricks and being characters in a domestic 
environment at the same time. The perceptual mechanisms at work here seem to generate 
similar questions as those raised in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of “seeing as” in his 
work Philosophical Investigations. Here Wittgenstein uses the example of a drawing by 
American psychologist Joseph Jastrow of a “duck-rabbit,” a drawing which can be taken to 
resemble either the head of a duck or a rabbit, depending on whether two interconnected 
shapes extending from an oval form are seen as “ears” or a “beak.” Wittgenstein seems to 
leave the question as to what it means to “see” a duck or a rabbit (and whether the seeing of 
one excludes the seeing of the other) open to question. E.H. Gombrich, however, in his 
classic study Art and Illusion, makes much use of the duck-rabbit image, and is in no doubt 
that “although we can switch from one reading to another … we cannot experience 
alternative readings at the same time” (Gombrich, 1982, 5). In Sartre’s terms, we might say 
that the viewer chooses to see the duck and in doing so “nihilates” the rabbit. With respect to 
the actor/character distinctions in the example of Ubu on the other hand, it does not seem 
plausible that we could not “experience the alternative readings at the same time” since the 
very point of the theatrical strategy seems to point towards a both-and rather than aneither-
or. 
One crucial difference between the duck-rabbit and the Brookian approach is that whereas 
the duck and rabbit seem to have an only arbitrary connection with one another (it “so 
happens” than one can see one or the other, depending), the actors manipulating bricks and 
Ubu at supper have, as Colin Counsell would point out, a “metaphorical” connection, in the 
same way that spinning plates in A Midsummer Nights’ Dream become metaphors for the 
magical forest. Avigal and Rimmon extend this observation to a more general level in 
relation to Peter Brook’s work: 
The actor’s capacity to subject the ‘poor’ objects to his creative imagination is thus 
seen as a metaphor of freedom, of man’s ability to liberate himself from the 
materialistic terror of an alienated world of mass consumption (Avigal and Rimmon-
Kenan, 1981, 22). 
 While this observation seems to contain more than a hint of Sartrean existentialism, Peter 
Brook’s theatre is not necessarily congruent with Sartre’s dualism. The transcendental 
aspects of Sartre’s thought contain traces of Platonism, in which the material world is 
radically opposed to a more authentic realm, which relates to “Being” and “Nothingness” for 
Sartre, or in Plato’s case, Ideal Forms. Indeed, in The Last Days of Socrates, Plato 
specifically draws a contrast between “visible” and “invisible” realms:  
“… we should assume two classes of things, one visible, and the other invisible … 
the invisible being invariable, and the visible never being the same … soul is more 
like the invisible, and the body more like the visible.” (Plato, 1969, 130) 
 Brook’s insistence on an apparent duality between the visible and invisible seems, on the 
surface at least, to conform to Platonic ideas, and the related conceptual schema in Sartre’s 
radical division between the perceptual and the imaginary. Indeed, Brook’s concept of 
theatre as the “invisible-made-visible” might even apply directly to Plato’s account of what it 
means to be a philosopher – one who “remains in the realm of the absolute, constant and 
invariable” (Plato, 1969, 131). In practice, however, Brook’s theatre does not seem to 
conform to this model. Despite Brook’s apparent desire to privilege the invisible over the 
visible, the theatre of Brook does not simply posit an invisible realm over and above the 
visible, for both the visible/material and the invisible/representational operate simultaneously. 
By creating self-negating images Brook’s theatre demonstrates that nothingness can operate 
even with a materially abundant medium. While in no way denying the material basis of 
theatrical representation, the “emptiness” of Brook’s stage allows for a reorientation of 
perception rather than a (re)confirmation of the visible, a material structure within which the 
imaginary can dwell.   
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[1]
 William Carroll points out that “The ‘vacuum’ of modern particle physics, whose 
fluctuations supposedly brings our universe into existence, is not absolutely nothing. It is 
only nothing like our present universe, but it is still something. How else could ‘it’ 
fluctuate?” Thomas Aquinas and Big Bang Cosmology available at 
http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/ti/carroll.htm. Accessed 21/06/10. 
[2]
 See chapter 11 of the Tao Te Ching, available at 
http://www.wussu.com/laotzu/laotzu11.html, translation by Gia-fu Feng and Jane English. 
Accessed 21/06/10. 
[3]
 I should note, however, that Garner’s notion of actuality is, as he puts it, “fuelled by 
difference and absence” and therefore does not exist in complete opposition to 
representation. 
[4]
 “For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from the world by its 
very nature; it must be able by its own efforts to withdraw from the world. In a word it must 
be free. Thus the thesis of unreality has yielded us the possibility of negation as its condition” 
(Sartre, 1972, 213). 
[5]
 Significantly, Kovács explains Sartre’s concept of nothing as “an empty space”:  Between 
what is and what could be there is a gap, an empty space, where man is free to choose. 
Nothingness is an empty moment in the world, where man is liberated from his past and has 
to choose (Kovács, 2006, 137).    
 
